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NOTES

MARITIME JURISDICTION OVER FISHERY RESOURCES*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Economic necessity and recent developments in marine
technology have caused man to begin his move into the sea
on a grand scale, occupying and exploiting it for
recreation, minerals, food, waste disposal, and possible
living space. These new technological advances and the
increased need for the traditional fishery resources have
precipitated the interests of nations in expanding their
exclusive jurisdictions further into an ocean space where
it had been traditionally free for all to use. Though this
move for exclusive jurisdiction is motivated by the uniform
desire of all nations to more efficiently utilize and conserve the resources and to protect them for national
exploitation, the means to achieve these goals in the
international community and the United States present a
number of difficult legal problems.
The modern development of the law of the marginal or
territorial waters commenced with Hugo Grotius in the early
part of the seventeenth century when he proclaimed the concept of freedom of the seas in order to secure for the
Dutch the right to fish for herring off the British coast.1
Another Dutchman, Corneilius von Bynkershoek, stated the
rule in 1702:
"Wherefore on the whole it seems a better
rule that the control of the land (over the sea) extends as
far as a cannon will carry; for that is as far as we seem
to have both command and possession."
During the eighteenth
century this "cannon shot" rule of state jurisdiction
developed an international acceptance and was equated to
one league from shore or three nautical miles. 3 Initially
the English opposed the Dutch theories, but later when
England became dominant on the seas, she also became an
aggressive proponent of the three mile limit. The rule was
See Headnotes
1. Allen, Legal Limits of Coastal Fishery Protection,
21 WASH. L. REV. 2 (1946).
2. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
482 (2d ed. 1962).
3. Allen, supra note 1, at 3.
*
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acquiesced to by the United States in a letter by Secretary
of State Jefferson on November 8, 1793 to the British and
French ministers. The United States acceptance was grounded
on the economic advantages afforded New England fishermen
wishing to frequent the waters adjacent to the Canada and
Newfoundland shores.4
Prior to the four conventions of the Law of the Sea
Conference held in Geneva in 1958, there was little that
could be concluded regarding the accepted international
rights and duties bearing on fishery jurisdiction. The
Geneva Fisheries Convention was the first to develop an
5
international code respecting fisheries.
Following a modified rationale of the 'rcannon shot"
rule, the 1958 Geneva Convention's code provides for the
partitioning of the oceans into five jurisdictional zones.
First is the zone of internal waters, including certain
bays, estuaries, and other adjacent waters, over which the
coastal state exercises complete sovereignty. Seaward of
this is the territorial sea, over which the sovereignty of
the coastal state is limited only by the right of innocent
passage by foreign ships. 6
There is no agreement among
states on a standard breadth of the territorial sea. In
late 1967, of 92 states which claimed a definite breadth
for their territorial waters, 28 (including the United
States) claimed three miles, 33 claimed twelve miles, and
24 adopted breadths between three and twelve miles. The
remaining seven had territorial claims in excess of twelve
7
miles.
Beyond territorial limits is the contiguous zone, in
which coastal states may exercise the control necessary to
prevent and punish infringements of their customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary regulation. The contiguous zone
may not extend more than twelve miles seaward of the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured; thus, countries claiming a twelve mile territorial

4.
5.

W. BISHOP, supra note 2, at 483.
Alexander, National Jurisdiction and the Use of the

Sea, 8 NAT. RES. J. 374 (1968).
6. Id. at 375.
7. Id.
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sea limit have no contiguous zone. 8 Equally important is
the fact that many countries now consider their contiguous
zone to be an exclusive fisheries area in which foreign
fishing is prohibited except by special arrangement. Some
28 states with territorial breadths of less than twelve
territorial fisheries zones to the twelve
miles have extra
9
mile limit.
A fourth jurisdictional zone in which the coastal state
has exclusive control over resources is the continental
shelf, the shallow platform out from the land for varying
distances beneath the sea. Three physical variables in
determining the extent of the continental shelf are: (1) the
depth at which the gentle incline of the shelf breaks to a
steeper slope, (2) the distance from shore at which this edge
of the shelf occurs, and (3) the existence of deep canyons
in the shelf, seaward of which there are additional shallow
areas. 1 0 The 1958 Geneva delegates defined the continental
shelf as "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the area of territorial
sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where
the depth of the super adjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas."
This definition also includes water areas adjoining the
coasts of islands. 1 1 Furthermore, living resources of the
continental shelf were defined as "organisms which, at the
harvestable stage are immobile on or under the seabed or are
unable to move except2 in constant physical contact with the
'1
seabed or subsoil."
The fifth zone constitutes the high seas, which are
open to all nations. Countries were guaranteed the rights
to freedom of navigation, freedom of fishing, freedom to
lay submarine cable and pipeline, and freedom to fly over
the high seas. 1 3 Nowhere in the Geneva Conventions, however,
is reference made to the legal status of the seabed and subsoil underlying the high seas beyond the limits of the

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
id.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ill
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continental shelf.

Final ratification of the code formulated at the Geneva
Conventions did not take place until March, 1966. Even then
it did not represent international law but only provided
precedent and standards for bilateral and multi-lateral
agreements. Out of the Conventions the following principles
represent a majority view of the nations present, and justify
attention as representing the significant attitude of the
international community in the immediate future:
(1) a
territorial sea of six miles is permissible but no pattern
is dominant, (2) a state may extend exclusive fishing rights
to a twelve mile limit, (3) a state may have an interest in
fishing in adjacent areas further removed than twelve miles
from its baseline, (4) traditional rights of fishing would
be respected, (5) world opinion does not approve exclusive
15
jurisdiction claims over large areas.
The only difference between the opinion of the majority
of nations at the Geneva Convention and the United States
position on jurisdiction was the extent of territorial sea
recognized. The United States representatives strongly
contended that the traditional three mile limit should prevail, while the majority of nations a 16reed that the six
mile territorial sea was permissible.
II.

UNITED STATES APPROACHES TO MARITIME JURISDICTION

United States policy on marine jurisdictional matters
rests on three principal bases:
(1) the regulations imposed
by the Geneva Conventions, (2) bilateral and multilateral
agreements which the U.S. has made with other states concerning specific uses of the sea, and (3) the division of
responsibility and authority between federal and state
17
governments in marine matters.

14. Id.
15.
L. ALEXANDER,
AND ZONES 34 (1967).

16.
17.

LAW OF THE SEA: OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES

Id. at 41.
Nomura, Fisheries Jurisdiction Beyond the Territorial

Sea. . .
With Special Reference to the Policy of the United
States, 44 WASH. L. REV. 308, 308-309 (1968).

112

United States control over fishing rights has been
extended beyond three miles from shore by the passage of
two Congressional acts. The first of these was Public
Law 88-308, passed on May 20, 1964, making it unlawful
for foreign fishermen to take continental shelf species.
The second was Public Law 89-658, passed on October 14,
1966, establishing a nine-mile zone contiguous to the
three-mile United States territorial sea, in which the
United States "will exercise the same exclusive rights
in respect to fisheries as it has in its territorial sea,
subject to the continuation of traditional fishing by
foreign states within this zone as may be recognized by
"18
the United States.
A.

Bilateral Treaties

Several bilateral fishery treaties in which the United
States participates are based on the rights created by
tradition. The present agreement between the United States
and Canada regarding U. S. fishing privileges in waters
south and west of Newfoundland and south of Quebec can be
traced to tradition prior to the American Revolution and
to treaties following the Revolutionary War and the War of
1812. Though there have been numerous conflicts concerning
these traditional fishing rights, the various issues were
finally submitted to arbitration in 1910 before the Hague
tribunal. It was ultimately decided that the grant of
liberty to fish off the coasts applied within three miles
from shore, that United States fishermen were subject to
Canadian conservation regulations even beyond three miles,
and that British authorities could require United States
vessels operating in Canadian territorial waters to report
to customs houses and pay taxes. The tribunal also proposed
the establishment of a commission to deal with disputes over
contested measures dealing with conservation. After the
decision of the tribunal, the United States and Britain
signed the treaty, presently in effect, embodying the
19
findings of the tribunal.

18. Teclaff, Jurisdiction Over Offshore Fisheries. . .
How Far into the High Seas, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 410 (1967).
19. Windley, International Practices Regarding Traditional
Fishing Privileges of Foreign Fishermen in Zones of Extended
Maritime Jurisdiction, 63 AM. J. INT'L LAW 491 (1969).
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In 1964 and 1965, the United States negotiated
agreements with Japan and the U.S.S.R. over fishing in
the eastern Bearing Sea for king crab (claimed by both
the United States and the U.S.S.R. as a continental
shelf resource) and in 1967 signed initial agreements
with Japan, the U.S.S.R., and Mexico over fishing by
fishermen of those countries in the United States ninemile contiguous fishing zone.
1.

United States-U.S.S.R. Treaty on the King Crab Fishery.

In January, 1965, representatives of both countries
met in Washington. The United States disagreed with the
Soviet contention that the king crab fishery qualified as
a traditional fishery, but recognized that an abrupt
cessation of the Soviet king crab fishery would work an
economic hardship upon the U.S.S.R., and that the king crabs
were not being fully utilized by the United States fishermen.
By an agreement signed on February 5, 1965, the United States
allowed the U.S.S.R. to continue its king crab fishery for
two years subject to (1) a reduced catch, (2) reciprocal
rights of boarding king crab fishing vessels to observe
enforcement of the agreement, (3) exchange of scientific
data on the exploited stocks, (4) delimitation of an area
where king crab could be fished by crab pots only (used only
by United States fishermen), and (5) no Soviet king crab
fishing south of the Aleutian Islands. 2 0 The agreement was
renegotiated in 1967, with the U.S.S.R. accepting a further
reduction in catch and again in January, 1969, with still
further reductions in catch and an increased area where
only crab pots could be used for king crab, and a quota on
21
the catch of tanner crab.
2.

United States-Japanese Treaty on the King Crab Fishery.

In November, 1964, representatives met in Washington to
discuss the continuation of the king crab fishery. Japan,
not a party to the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
maintained that the king crab was a high seas fisheries
resource and not subject to the exclusive control of the
United States. In an exchange of notes on November 25, 1964,

20.
21.

Id. at 493.
Id.
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Japan agreed to reduce its catch and to provide scientific
data on its fisheries. Also an area was delimited for the
use of crab pots exclusively. 2 2 The agreement was renegotiated in January, 1967, with Japan agreeing to a further
reduction in catch, and again in December, 1968, with Japan
agreeing to a further reduction in catch and an increased
area for the crab pot use, and to the2 3 adoption of measures
relating to the tanner crab fishing.
3. United States-U.S.S.R. Treaty on the
West Coast Contiguous Fisheries Zone.
Representatives met in Washington in early 1967, to
discuss Soviet fishing in the three to twelve mile contiguous
fisheries zone, and to discuss simultaneously Soviet fishing
beyond twelve miles on stocks important to United States
fishermen. An agreement was signed on February 13, 1967,
allowing Soviet fishing within twelve miles in various areas
off the coast of Alaska, and providing for Soviet vessels to
anchor and transfer catch and other goods within various
areas. The U.S.S.R. agreed to reduce fishing efforts in
certain areas beyond 12 miles, including an area off the
mouth of the Columbia River important to United States sports
In December, 1968, the treaty was renegotiated
fishermen. 2 4
with some changes. Both agreed to restrict fishing for
certain species during the winter months in six locations
lying between the 200 and 450 meter isobaths and to take
other measures to protect these species. The Soviets agreed
not to trawl on important halibut and king crab grounds
during specified periods. The United States agreed to allow
Soviet loading operations in three additional locations within
the United States contiguous fisheries zone and to allow
Soviet fishing within the contiguous zone in certain areas
25
along the Aleutian Islands.
4. United States-U.S.S.R. Treaty on the
East Coast Contiguous Fisheries Zone.
Representatives signed a one year agreement in Moscow
in November, 1967, regarding the populations of red hake

22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 494.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.
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and other fish. The agreement provided for a discontinuance
of Soviet and United States fishing between January 1 and
April 1, 1968, in a 4600-square-mile area beyond twelve
miles off Long Island; for the total catch in the rmidAtlantic bight" area south of 39 degrees north latitude not
to exceed the 1968 catch; and for fishermen of both countries
not to conduct specialized fisheries for certain species in
the mid-Atlantic area. In return, the United States granted
the U.S.S.R. the privilege of fishing within the three to
twelve mile contiguous fisheries zone between January 1 and
April 1, 1968, in a ten mile area along central Long Island,
and of conducting loading operatings among fishing vessels
within the contiguous fisheries zone in areas off New Jersey
and Long Island during specified periods. 26 The agreement
was renegotiated in December, 1968, and generally had the
same provision, the only difference being a southward
extension of the abstention zone and minor changes with
27
respect to species.
5.

United States-Japan on the United States
Contiguous Fisheries Zone.

On May 9, 1967, the Japanese Government agreed to curtail certain operations of Japanese fishermen within various
areas of the three to twelve mile United States contiguous
fisheries zone. The note did not recognize the exclusive
control over the 3-to 12-mile fishing zone claimed by the
United States. 28 This agreement was renegotiated in
December, 1968. The present treaty continues the policy
of the earlier treaty and continues the curtailment of
Japanese fishing activities in the United States contiguous
29
fisheries zone, and in a few zones adjacent to that zone.
6.

United States-Mexico on the Contiguous
Fisheries Zone.

By treaty, signed on October 27, 1967, both the United
States and Mexico continue to reserve their positions on
the breadth of the territorial sea, Mexico claiming nine

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 495.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 496.
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miles and the United States claiming the traditional three
miles. The treaty applies only to fishing in the waters
between nine and twelve miles off each other's coasts. The
agreement lists the species which each country claims its
fishermen traditionally fished in the nine to twelve mile
zones off each country's coasts, and contained the following
provisions: Annual meetings to review operations of the
agreement were to be conducted, and annual reports on volume
of catch and areas fished would be exchanged. Intergovernmental co-operation in studies of stocks of fish and shrimp
of common concern off the coasts of Mexico would be conducted.
Recreational fishing by United States citizens in Mexican
fishery zones during the next five years would be allowed.
Finally, the total catch of each listed species by fishermen
of each country in the zone of the other during the five
years commencing January 1, 1968, would not exceed the total
30
catch during the five years preceeding that date.
III.

DOMESTIC POLICY REGARDING MARITIME JURISDICTION

Domestically, the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer
Continental Shelf Act have had the effect of dividing between
federal and state governments the resources adjacent to the
coast of the United States, thus raising the problem of where
the jurisdiction of the state ends and that of the federal
government begins. Abrogating the California decision giving
federal authority to submerged lands underlying the marginal
sea, Section 3(a) (1) of the Submerged Lands Act grants to the
states "title to and ownership of" all lands underlying
"navigable" waters within their boundaries. "Boundaries"
include the boundaries possessed by a state at the time it
entered the union, or as subsequently approved by Congress,
but in no event are such boundaries allowed to go beyond
three miles from the coastline in the Atlantic or Pacific
Oceans or beyond three leagues in the Gulf. 3 1 The "coastline"
is defined as the low water mark on the coast or the "seaward
limit of inland waters." The Submerged Lands Act further
provides that states which had no defined maritime boundary
when admitted to the Union may extend their boundaries to a
32
point not to exceed the three miles mentioned earlier.

30. Id.
31. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-14 (1964); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43
(1964); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1967).
32. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1964).
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The majority of states entered the Union with no defined
maritime boundary in their acts of admission and thus derived
their authority over a three-mile marginal sea from the
Congressional grant under the Submerged Lands Act. In contrast, however, difficulties in determining the width of the
marginal sea did develop with respect to those few states
which entered the Union with Congressional approved boundaries
in excess of the three mile limit. By judicial decision the
Supreme Court made the claims in Louisiana, Alabama, and
Mississippi conforming. 3 3 In Texas and Florida the acts of
admission provided for a boundary of three leagues seaward.
In these states the boundary is now located three leagues
seaward of the coast in the Gulf Stream and three miles seaward at other locations. 34 Thus, with the passing of the
extended fisheries legislation in 1966, these states were
able to exercise their authority in state jurisdictional areas
35
that was not possible under earlier United States policy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Given a hierarchy of boundary delineation rules that
are now either established or reasonably predictable, questions
on policy using these rules must be examined. From the
historical context, freedom in the fishery resources creates
waste. Furthermore, any effort to restrict this freedom will
cause conflicts as to others wanting a share of the wealth.
The real question is not whether the nations of the world can
avoid the inevitable conflicts for unclaimed wealth, but
whether they can continue to pay the high price to keep the
fisheries'resources free. Obviously, they cannot. Thus,
policy should be formulated to minimize the conflicts with
the guiding principal being that of applying science to protect the resource as it is used. The 1958 Convention provided
for national expansion beyond the 200-meter isobath. At that
time it was not believed to be feasible and was therefore not
claimed by the nations represented. Now the indications seem
to be that depth of water is not nearly so important an
obstacle to exploitation, and thus the expansion policy is
raised.

33. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
34. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
35. Gross, Maritime Boundaries of the States, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 643 (1966).
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There seem to be two schools of thought regarding
the policy position the United States and other nations
should take on future expansion and negotiation on ocean
space jurisdiction. The first urges a "wait and see"
doctrine until the problems and the interests are further
clarified. This position places considerable emphasis
upon the opportunity for new departures in international
co-operation and organization in an effort to preserve
the seas from exploitive influences of the nation-state
system. This position is rather idealistic and contrary
to previous conduct of states. It could succeed only if
all nations are properly schooled in preserving what is
becoming limited world fishery resources. Increased
education and time are the critical elements to this
solution's advocates.
The second position urges positive action due to the
vested interests that are being created under existing
laws that are not necessarily based on good conservation
policy nor the position the United States should ideally
favor. Under this position, the United States must proceed, by unilateral actions and declarations if necessary,
to acquire that which is available in the coastal area,
and to assert freedom to what it can in the seas beyond,
postponing new law until the day when conflicts produce
a need for agreement.

119

